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INTRODUCTION
The latter half of the twentieth century has been a
time of tremendous change for the Roman Catholic Church in
America.

These changes have produced many disagreements

between the laity, who no longer feel bound to the Church's
teaching authority, and the hierarchy, who continue to
emphasize traditional teachings.

The interpretations of

these disagreements vary from author to author.

But they

can be categorized into two basic interpretations.

More

longstanding popular and academic notions have suggested
that the majority of the Church's members is in a state of
tension.

In this scenario, differences between the laity

and the Church's hierarchy have threatened the very
existence of the Church, with both sides refusing to yield
in their differing opinions, and the laity threatening
massive withdrawals if teachings and institutional practices
do not change.

But some writers, such as Greeley (1977),

Kennedy (1984, 1985), and Greeley and Durkin (1984) question
this scenario.

They claim that tension is minimal, because

for most of the laity, it simply doesn't exist. The laity
have become "selective Catholics," 1 who ignore, rather than
challenge, Church leaders on many matters, but remain loyal

1 I borrow this term from Greeley and Durkin (1984: 3).
1
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to the institution through their continued participation in
it locally.

The popular wisdom with its dire predictions

about the laity is, for these writers, simply incorrect.
The conflict image of the American Catholic Church may
be lingering from the turbulence of the late 1960s and early
1970s.

As a writer from that time, Osborne (1969) provides

an opportunity to look back into that time.

Religious

reform, which Osborne claims began long before Vatican II,
is the arena for change among Catholics.

And one of the

greatest religious reforms involved ignoring official Church
rules, such as attending Mass weekly; acts which defy the
very authority of the Church to promulgate and interpret
"Natural Law."

Osborne characterized Catholicism, then, as

an institution which had "to endure the struggle of a 'house
divided against itself'" (Osborne, 1969: 50; emphasis
added).

Hoge (1986) represents a contemporary example of

the church-in-conflict viewpoint.

Comparing American

Catholics to a river and the Roman hierarchy to a flood
gate, Hoge predicts a future of escalating tensions in the
U.S. Church.

He claims that the hierarchy's failure to

change those teachings with which the laity disagree will
result in an explosion of bitter tension between the two.
Statement of the Problem
Much has been written about selective catholicism, but
little from a purely sociological viewpoint.

Much of the

writing has been descriptive in nature and has centered on
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what I call an indicator of selective Catholicism, namely
the disagreements between the laity and the hierarchy.

In

fact, the focus on this indicator probably has contributed
to the persistence of conflict models of the Church in
America.

Given this focus, it is hard to break away from

psychological and social-psychological analyses of this
phenomenon.

The descriptions of selective Catholicism

below, in fact, frequently rely on such viewpoints.
There are few works which ground an analysis of
selective catholicism in a macrosociological explanation.
All of the descriptions of selective Catholicism mention the
institutional detachment which is its root.

But for many,

the social changes responsible for this detachment receive
secondary treatment, while the thrust of the study concerns
the latest trends in the indicators: how many Catholics
practice birth control now as opposed to the early 1970s,
for example.

Conversely, those works which do address

macrosociological trends, such as secularization theory do
not relate them specifically to the phenomenon of selective
Catholicism.
My goal is to sociologically scrutinize selective
Catholicism.

I will examine in detail the role of cultural,

socioeconomic/demographic, and institutional changes in its
development.

Thus, I try to explain for American Catholics

what Luckmann (1967) claimed that most sociology tries to
explain: the effect of societal forces on the individual.

I
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will also reverse the analysis to examine the effects of
selective catholicism on the Church currently and try to
project them in the future.
My review of the socioeconomic/demographic, cultural,
and institutional changes appears in the third and fourth
chapters.

Before I move on to that, though, I will examine

several empirical indicators of selective Catholicism in the
second chapter.

My assessment of the organizational "state

of the Church" appears in the fifth chapter.

Finally in the

sixth chapter, I offer some suggestions for future research
which could serve to keep a sociological focus on this
phenomenon.
Selective Catholicism Defined
The selective Catholicism concept asserts that policy
disagreements among active catholics are not primarily aired
in the manner of protest and conflictual dissent.

Rather,

Catholics selectively ignore those teachings promulgated by
the hierarchy with which they disagree, and accept others
with which they agree.

Fichter (1977: 163) states:

What seems to be happening now is that more and more
catholics are simply disregarding the official
pronouncements of the church hierarchy. They are not in
revolt. They are not openly disrespectful of the
prelates, but they are simply no longer impressed by the
need of attending to directives and prohibitions.
Leege and Gremillion (1986: 4) identified this selective
Catholicism (without giving a specific label to it) through
data collected in the Notre Dame study of Catholic Parish

5

Life. 2

They state that active Catholics

feel comfortable with selecting which of the Church's
teachings they will espouse and which they will reject.
In this respect, American Catholics act very much like
the increasingly well-educated, middle-class Americans
that they are. They accept human authority less because
of its traditional nature and more because of its
appropriate positions. Yet they remain loyal to the
underlying institution, practice its rites, and continue
to work for it.
Kennedy (1984, 1985) contends that writers and
reporters characterize the Church as in conflict because
they attribute that which is most visible, namely protest
and dissent, as normative for most American Catholics.

This

could not be further from the truth, according to Kennedy.
Rather, dissent among American Catholics and between them
and Church leaders characterizes the minority, whom he terms
"First culture Catholics."

The growing majority, the

"Second culture Catholics," while holding the same opinions
and attitudes as the minority, do not consider themselves
rebels or dissenters.

With the decline of authoritarianism

in the West, they no longer regard the Church's hierarchical
authority as legitimate.

According to Kennedy (1985: 12):

Just as most people do not think of every choice as
another act in a never resolved rebellion against the
authority of their own parents, so Second culture
Catholics' do not see their choices as continuing
episodes of rebellion against the pope, the bishops, or
2The Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life, which I
refer to throughout this paper, includes the following
reports as of March, 1988: Leege and Gremillion (1984,
1986); Dolan and Leege (1985); Leege and Trozzolo (1985a,
1985b); Searle and Leege (1985a, 1985b); Leege (1986a,
1986b, 1987a, 1987b, 1988). A summary of the first ten
reports was published by Gremillion and Castelli (1987).

6

ecclesiastical authority of any kind. In truth, many of
them do not think about church leaders much at all.
Thus the version of Catholicism which characterizes
catholics as reeling in discontent over such issues as
priestly celibacy or women priests is inaccurate.

Those

portraits, no matter how visible, spring from the minority
catholics who are still attached to the institutional
structure of the Church.

For the majority, the vital issues

of life flow not from the hierarchy, but from their
understanding of the whole society (Kennedy, 1984).
Greeley and Durkin (1984: 10-11) propose much the same
scenario as Kennedy:
With the decline in importance of institutional
structures, Catholics increasingly look to their faith
for comfort and challenge, for inspiration in life and
consolation in death. Few take seriously anymore the
Church as a teacher on either moral or social action
matters. The Church is not for ethics; it is for
religion.
There is no reeling discontent.

Active American Catholics

still support and remain loyal to their Church, especially
their local parishes.
own terms.

But their loyalty is offered on their

This usually means they ignore the official

Church teachers and devote more of their attention to local
matters than to the affairs of the pope and the bishops, or
issues such as women's ordination.

Greeley and Durkin

assume this is especially true among Catholics aged twenty
and younger.
Greeley (1977: 272) terms this kind of Catholic "the
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communal catholic. 113

Communal Catholics strongly and

proudly identify themselves as Catholics, yet ignore the
pronouncements of the hierarchy.

He predicts that "the most

likely projection for the future [of the American Catholic
Church] is the emergence of a large group of 'communal
catholics'" who "refuse to take seriously the teaching
authority of the institutional Church."

Furthermore,

Greeley (1977) states, those most likely to be communal
catholics are younger and well-educated.
As empirical evidence for this prediction, Greeley
(1977) points to the rejection of the official sexual
morality but continued support of selected aspects of the
Church, such as Catholic schools.

Thus, the communal

Catholics may identify themselves as Catholics and remain
actively involved in many Church activities.

But they will

not be strongly attached to the Church's formal teachings
nor its teachers.

Communal Catholics will strongly identify

themselves as Catholics, but will select for themselves
which aspects of Catholicism to accept.
The above authors state that American catholics do not
conflict with church hierarchy, but selectively ignore them.
American lay people are no longer attached to, and thus feel
no obligation to obey, the Church's teaching authority
(primarily the Pope and the Roman Curia).

They therefore

3curiously, Greeley (1977) never explains why he uses
the term "communal" in describing this individualistic type
of behavior.
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feel no obligation to participate in the Church on anyone's
but their own terms.

Those terms include active

participation in the local parishes despite their ignoring
many Church teachings.

When Greeley and Durkin (1984: 11)

state that "the Church is not for ethics; it is for
religion," they mean that the laity accept it only as an
arena for religious practice, not as a teacher.
Not only does this explain a lack of current conflict
among the laity, it predicts the same for the immediate
future.

Hoge's assertion that possible Vatican-imposed

restraints on the American Church will result in "increased
tension" and "polarization and alienation among the laity"
(Hoge, 1986: 297) does not seem likely in this framework.
The laity will selectively ignore future actions of the
hierarchy with which they disagree, just as they do now.
Why?

Because they realize that the hierarchy cannot enforce

most of their teachings (Greeley and Durkin, 1984),
particularly moral pronouncements, and they feel no
obligation to obey anyway.
The Development of Selective Catholicism
Selective Catholicism, then, is religious
individualism.

rt departs from the American Catholicism of

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when adherence
to Church teachings was more the norm.
Like all other social changes, it did not develop in a
vacuum.

It is caused in part by a detachment from the
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Church's teaching authority, despite regular participation
in the Church locally.

The authors cited above tie it to

other social changes such as the decline of institutions and
authoritarianism.

I suggest that selective catholicism

resulted from socioeconomic and demographic changes within
the Catholic lay population, secularization and the rise of
"radical individualism" within the larger American society,
and institutional changes within the Church itself.
In some ways, these changes affected the development
of selective Catholicism directly.

In other ways, they

caused detachment from the Church's teaching authority,
which in turn affected the development of selective
Catholicism.

Put briefly, detachment from the Church's

teaching authority is an

intervening variable between

social and institutional changes and the development of
selective catholicism.
Upward socioeconomic mobility and greater religious
tolerance, beginning after world War I, allowed American
Catholics to break away from the protective isolation
originally afforded by the Church and distance themselves
from it.

Just like with any other social group, as more

Catholic generations were born in America and enjoyed
relatively greater affluence, they moved into the mainstream
American culture.

There, the laity were exposed to a

society in which religion was privatized.

As Catholics

became American and privatized their religion, they began to
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practice selective catholicism.

Religion's role was

compartmentalized within their social lives.

Like most

other American institutions, it occupied a less central
position in their social circles.

The Church no longer

occupied a prominent enough position to affect their
everyday decision making.

This lack of attachment prompted

them to believe in an individualistic, i.e. selective
manner.

Selective Catholicism further developed as

individualism increasingly pervaded American culture
beginning in the 1960s.
These cultural and demographic changes were eventually
accompanied by institutional changes within the Church.

The

windows opened by the Second Vatican Council may have
reinforced the developing individualism among the American
laity, who more and more were becoming like their nonCatholic neighbors in their appreciation of democratic
institutions and individual initiative.

However, it may

have been Vatican II which encouraged the laity to
participate in the Church locally though they were detached
from the Church's teaching authority.

INDICATORS OF SELECTIVE CATHOLICISM
Changing Attitudes
The literature regarding Catholics' attitudes,
especially attitudes about sexual morality, is abundant
indeed.

The fact that Catholics disagree with their

teachers and do things which the hierarchy condemns is
common knowledge.

This knowledge is in fact the basis for

claims that the laity are in a state of tension and on the
verge of leaving the Church, if not revolting against it.
Hoge (1986), for example, would compare the differences of
opinion to a river and a flood gate, with the hierarchical
flood gate bursting if it does not yield to the lay pressure
to change teachings.

But an examination of these

differences of opinion can reveal selective Catholicism.

Of

all the documentation of the laity's differences with the
hierarchy, Leege and Gremillion (1986) and Gallup and
Castelli (1987) point out the selective rather than
oppositional nature of the differences.
Both Leege and Gremillion (1986) and Gallup and
Castelli (1987) use attitudes regarding abortion and
contraception to illustrate the

selectiv~

nature in which

Catholics form their opinions.

Both the Notre Dame data

collected from active parishioner and Gallup poll data
collected from the general population showed that Catholics
11
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generally disagree with the Church's ban on contraceptives,
but generally agree on its condemnation of abortion.
example, Leege and Gremillion (1986:

4)

For

asked parishioners

their level of agreement to the following statements: "The
Church should remain strong in its opposition to the use of
contraceptives;" and "The Church should remain strong in its
opposition to abortion."

Possible responses ranged from

to 4, with 4 meaning strong agreement.

1

The mean score on

the first question.was 2.23, showing disapproval of the
Church's opposition to contraception.

The mean score on the

second was 3.35, showing a fairly strong approval of the
Church's opposition to abortion.

It was this trend which

led Leege and Gremillion to conclude that catholics do not
disagree with the hierarchy for the sake of disagreeing.
They also believe Catholics are not content to accept
teachings on the basis of tradition alone.

The active

Catholics in their sample listen to and consider the moral
teaching of the Church, "but ... in the end will consult
their conscience and experience in deciding whether to
accept or reject it" (Leege and Gremillion, 1986: 7).
Gallup and Castelli (1987) point out the same
relationship between abortion and contraception attitudes
among Catholics in the general population.

They state that

American Catholics "accept church teachings only when it
makes sense in terms of their own consciences" (Gallup and
Castelli, 1987: 183).

Thus they found that Catholics

13

disagree with the Church on teachings related to sexual
morality, but tend to agree on "life issues" such as
abortion.

Catholics, however, do not only disagree with the

conservative teachings.

Several moderate and liberal

bishops have proposed a "seamless garment" social philosophy
whereby "life issues" should be linked together and
approached by a common philosophy: e.g. opposition to
abortion, the arms race, socioeconomic inequalities,
abortion, and capital punishment.

But Gallup polls show

that catholics overwhelmingly support the death penalty
(Gallup and Castelli, 1987).

And the Notre Dame study

discovered that most active Catholics do not consider
attitudes about nuclear disarmament "a valid test of whether
or not one is a true Catholic" (Leege, 1988: 4). 4

A

"seamless garment" approach is not likely to be very popular
since poll data reveal catholics as relying on their own
individual judgment to construct their beliefs.

Unlike the

bishops, the laity tend not to adopt unifying principles,
but apply principles (such as the "life principles") to
certain situations as they see fit (Leege, 1988).
Mass Attendance
Osborne (1969) used attendance figures to demonstrate
the turbulence in the U.S. Catholic Church in the late 1960s
4 rn fact, Leege (1988) reveals, a 1987 Gallup-National
Catholic Reporter poll discovered that only one-third of
those who identified themselves as catholic had heard of the
American bishops' pastoral letter on nuclear arms.
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and continuing through the early 1970s.

But Mass attendance

figures which once revealed a Church in crisis in the 1960s
and 1970s today can demonstrate the emergence of selective
catholicism.

Osborne (1969: 44) claimed that:

Mass attendance as a norm and behavior pattern is one
thing. But the Mass is also the central ritual of
Catholicism, if not its most distinguishing feature. It
is probably no exaggeration to say that with respect to
the future of Catholicism "as the Mass goes, so goes the
Church." Boas, Malinowski, and a host of other
scientific students of religion assert the primacy of
ritual. Anthony Wallace, an anthropologist from the
University of Pennsylvania, makes the point quite
clearly when he says, "Ritual is religion in action; it
is the cutting edge of the tool ... it is ritual which
accomplishes what religion sets out to do." What occurs
in or around the Mass, therefore, carries far more
import for the future of the Catholic religion than what
happens to parochial schools or to the chancery.
Catholic schools and the chancery are not where "the
action is."
Likewise, Gallup and Castelli (1987: 26) hold that "Mass
attendance is ... important because it serves as a barometer
of more general belief and practice."

They furthermore

interpret opinion data to conclude that Catholics feel more
strongly than most Protestants that weekly religious
services are important.

The weekly Mass is the focal point

of Catholic activity for the Church.
activity that all catholics share.

It is the one catholic
If, then, Mass

attendance can gauge "the state of the laity," I believe it
points toward the rise of selective Catholicism in the
1980s.
In 1969, traditional Mass attendance was dropping and
showed no indication of increasing again, especially among
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the young.

Although types of "underground Mass" (Osborne

1969: 45) and Masses held by cult-like fellowship
organizations were gaining in appeal, Mass attendance was
dropping on the whole.

Thus Osborne, and no doubt many

writers of the time, were moved to label Catholicism as a
Church in crisis.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many,

especially young and educated, Catholics aired their
disagreements with the hierarchy by withdrawing their
attendance (Roof and McKinney, 1987).

In 1963, for example,

71 percent of the Catholic respondents to a National Opinion
Research Center survey stated that they attended Mass
weekly.

By 1974, that percentage had dropped to 50 percent

(Greeley, 1977; Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt, 1976).
Gallup polls showed that the decline was strongest between
1968 and 1978, when the total percentage of catholics
attending weekly Mass dropped from 65 to 52 percent (Gallup
and Castelli, 1987).
But currently, attendance figures have stabilized
(Gallup and Castelli, 1987; Gallup and Poling, 1980), with
the proportion of Catholics attending weekly Mass remaining
at 51 percent in 1987 (Gallup and Castelli, 1987).

Also,

Mass attendance among younger adult Catholics (ages 18-30)
has increased in the past ten years, and now attendance is
positively correlated with higher education, 5 according to
5Albrecht and Heaton (1984) discovered positive
relationships between education and church attendance within
several religious denominations. This was despite a general
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NORC and Gallup surveys (Gallup and Castelli, 1987; Leege
and Trozzolo, 1985a).

Life-cycle changes can partially ·

explain the change, as "baby boom" Catholics in their late
20s and early 30s have children and return to Church (Gallup
and Castelli, 1987).

However, it also implies that "if

there is a policy discontent among educated young Catholics
[who still participate in the Church] ... it is manifested in
a different way than in failure to participate in Mass"
(Leege and Trozzolo, 1985a: 5).
If Osborne's (1969) statement about the centrality of
ritual in religion is valid, then the changes in American
Catholics' attendance since the mid-1970s signals a change
in American Catholicism from a "Church in conflict."
"Policy discontent" is not manifested in absences or
protests.

American Catholics, despite their relatively

strong attendance figures, hold much the same attitudes they
did in the early 1970s.

But the years of the dramatic drops

in attendance have been over for some time.

Instead of

leaving the Church, they have become selective Catholics.
Privatized Religion
Despite steady Mass attendance trends since the late
1970s, the Church has not regained its status in the lives
of American Catholics from the days of the immigrant Church,
before World War I.

The recent Notre Dame study of catholic

negative relationship in the national population.
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parishes empirically investigated the role the Church plays
in active American catholics' lives.

Analyses of the Notre

Dame data have confirmed the existence of the privatized
religion which generates selective Catholicism among
American Catholics.
Leege and Gremillion (1984) found evidence of the
Church's privatized role in the lives of its members.

On

the one hand, they discovered that fully 85 percent of
Catholic parishioners feel the Church meets their spiritual
needs.

Almost half are actively involved in activities and

organizations beyond weekly religious ceremonies.

Yet, on

the other hand, they state "whether contemporary American
parishes are meaningful social communities is another
matter" (Leege and Gremillion 1984: 6).

Seventy-five

percent of their sample indicated that leaving their parish
would not upset them very much.

And 45 percent reported

that their parish did not meet their "social needs."

In

brief, Catholics regard their parishes positively as
religious institutions.

However they do not seem to rate

their parishes as important socially.

Here is an example of

the Church's playing a limited role within Catholics' lives.
Within the sphere of religion, it is warmly regarded.

But

outside of that sphere, it has little influence because it
isn't considered important.
Leege and Trozzolo (1985b) discovered further evidence
of the Church's limited influence through parishioners'
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views of the purpose of their parish.

"Even though

parishioners used communitarian language to define the
parish, they use quite self-centered language when asked
about the fundamental problems of human existence and how
they are overcome" (Leege and Trozzolo 1985b: 8).

Many

catholics in their sample defined their parishes as
communities or fellowships.

Most, then, probably

intellectually accept the Vatican II characterization of the
Church as "the people of God."

Yet when asked to describe

what they considered "the fundamental problem of human
existence," many resorted to individualistic concepts.
Despite voicing communal ideals for their local parishes,
many Catholics characterize their deepest concerns as
individualistic in nature.

This is significant, for Leege

and Trozzolo believe these operative beliefs may shape a
parish more than the intellectual characterizations which
the parishioners hold.

Thus parishioners may shape their

parish into a collectivity of individuals pursuing
individual needs.

More importantly, these beliefs may

indicate that Catholics do not feel the Church addresses
what they consider "the fundamental problem of human
existence."

If this is the case, the Church can have

nothing but limited influence in its members' lives.

The

laity will not look toward it to shape their behavior if it
addresses non-fundamental life issues.
In yet another analysis, Leege (1986) reveals that
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institutional detachment may be most prevalent among the
young and educated.

Catholics who attend Church regularly

feel it is a good and proper place to address needs varying
from: traditional religious needs, such as religious
education for children; normally stressful needs, such as
family difficulties; and extremely stressful needs, such as
unemployment.

Many felt that they could bring these needs

to their parish and receive help.
would do so if help were available.
uniform trend.

And many more said they
But this is not a

Younger, more educated, and higher income

catholics are more likely than older, less educated, and
lower income Catholics to turn elsewhere to meet their
needs, such as professional counselors.

Leege (1986: 6)

concludes that "younger Catholics of higher educational and
income attainments, who are currently raising their
families, have moved away from the parish and its staff as a
central point of orientation for many life problems."

And,

Leege found, even if help in many of these services were
available at churches where they aren't currently, the
younger, more educated Catholics would nonetheless search
for them elsewhere.

Leege has confirmed that institutional

detachment is more prevalent among young, well educated, and
higher income lay persons as other writers (Greeley and
Durkin, 1984; Greeley, 1977) have speculated.
The most recently released findings of the study show
that American catholics accept the hierarchy's authority to
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speak on various issues to the degree those issues affect
their personal lives (Leege, 1987b; Gremillion and Castelli,
1987).

When the issue is international poverty, for

example, the laity feel it most proper for the hierarchy to
speak out, as this issue does not personally affect them
much.

At the other extreme, however, the laity feels it is

least proper for the hierarchy to speak out about subjects
much closer to themselves, e.g. birth control.

Thus,

Catholics may reject Church authority when the proclaimed
norm treads on areas they regard as personal freedoms. 6
However, granting legitimacy to the hierarchy's teaching on
national and international issues does not translate into
the laity's acceptance of it.

As Leege (1987b: 12) states,

the hierarchy's pronouncements become merely one element in
the individual's "calculus" of her moral attitudes.

The

Church's teaching authority plays a limited role in the
individual's outlook.
In summary, the Notre Dame researchers have found that
the catholic Church, as an institution, does not currently
play a central moral role in the lives of its active
members.

Therefore, it is safe to say that American

Catholics in general are not strongly attached to the
6unfortunately, it seems that the Notre Dame study used
only birth control to test the laity's acceptance of the
hierarchy's teaching on individual behavior. Lay catholics'
attitudes about the Church's role in birth control are well
known. Another variable, such as legitimacy of Church
teaching on charitable contributions, might have shed more
light on this issue.
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institutional Church.

The Notre Dame researchers have

demonstrated the lack of institutional attachment which lies
at the heart of the selective Catholicism thesis.
Finally, in a separate study, Gallup and Castelli
(1987) highlight institutional detachment through catholic
women's opinions about the way the Church treats them.

They

state that
... it would be difficult to look at these data and
conclude that Catholic women as a group are angry. The
data suggest that many women who believe the Church does·
not respond well to women in general are more satisfied
with the way their own parish treats them - women are
three times as likely to give the Church a "poor" rating
for its handling of women in general as for the way it
meets their own needs. Put another way, women who feel
dissatisfied with the Church's treatment of them as
women are more satisfied with the Church's treatment of
them as persons (Gallup and Castelli, 1987: 46-47).
Gallup and Castelli have found that women believe the Church
treats them poorly, but are not overly concerned about it. 7
It does not seem to touch them personally, although they are
aware that what many consider mistreatment by Church
authorities exists.

It may not affect them because their

particular ox is not being gored, but also because they are
not attached strongly enough to the institution to feel it.
7Gallup and Castelli make this assertion based on
national Gallup poll data. Their sample.includes both
religiously active Catholics and inactive Catholic women, as
well as women of all ages. Thus it is conceivable that
older women's acceptance of traditional female roles in the
Church might dilute younger women's rejection of them in the
aggregate survey results. Although the authors' conclusion
makes sense within the context of American society's
privatizing of religion, the potential impact of this
question makes it a compelling subject for future study.
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If a woman's activity in the Church is limited to building
her individual religious faith and the Church does not play
an active role in her life, then the actions of the
hierarchy, for better or worse, probably won't be of much
concern.

THE EFFECTS OF ASSIMILATION, PRIVATIZATION,
AND RADICAL INDIVIDUALISM
Having demonstrated the existence of selective
catholicism and privatization of American Catholics'
religion, I now attempt to explain how each developed, and
just as importantly, how the latter led to the former.
After World War I, and especially after the 1940s, change
became the dominant force for the Church.

American

catholics experienced upward socioeconomic mobility and as
they became better educated and moved to the suburbs.

These

trends led to what many called the "Americanization" of the
catholic Church.

Catholics began to appear in all strata of

American society and resemble other Americans in religious
behavior as well as affluence.

As they "became American,"

their religion was privatized.

Sociological theorists have

explained that privatizing religion leads to a selective
style of believing because it cannot offer an allencompassing system of belief.
Americanization was only the first step toward the
development of selective Catholicism.

After this trend

began, major shifts in the dominant culture occurred.

In

the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new and intense emphasis
on individualism further inspired American church members to
selectively believe.

This change enhanced the trend of
23
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individuals' building their own private faiths.
Socioeconomic Changes: Assimilation and Privatization
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Catholicism
offered immigrant catholic generations protection from a
hostile new society.

The prominence of the Church in

people's lives during the first half of the twentieth
century derived from this defensive nature (Kennedy, 1984).
"In the immigrant neighborhoods the parish was a central
community institution.

Most often organized according to

language or nationality, it gave the newcomers a source of
identity in a strange new world" (Dolan and Leege 1985: 2).
Additionally, the Church's stress on individual salvation as
the central focus of human life provided consolation, as
well as protection, in the face of difficulty.

Catholics

found unemployment, poverty, and prejudice easier to
tolerate because of the Church's constant assurance of
eternal salvation (Osborne, 1969).

The Church, then, played

a central role in its members' lives.
I believe it is important not to romanticize the
behavior of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American
Catholics.

It is overly simplistic to characterize them as

unquestioningly obedient and intellectually passive to Rome.
American Catholics' advocacy for a more democratic and
pragmatic approach to Church issues received stern
opposition from the Vatican at the turn of the century
(Hoge, 1986; Hennesey, 1981).

Nonetheless, educational and
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socioeconomic levels were low, and it is safe to say that
while they were not a perfectly homogeneous population,
catholics' disagreements with the hierarchy were much fewer
than they were to be later this century.
Socioeconomic and demographic changes occurred most
rapidly for Catholics, as for all Americans, after World War
II.

The post-war boom had an especially strong effect on

the American Catholic Church.

European immigration to the

U.S. already had been slowed for many years: larger
proportions of the Catholic population were native-born.
Catholics began to move to the suburbs and their children
attained more education.

American Catholics began to

resemble the American mainstream.
According to Gleason (1969), this occurred not only in
terms of socioeconomic status but also mainstream attitudes
and beliefs.

American Catholics, he felt, were losing their

explicit and well defined self-consciousness.

The process

of Americanization, or acculturation, eliminated any need
for protection from American society, since American
Catholics were becoming a part of it.

When this need

diminished, so did the role of the Church in the lives of
its members (Kim, 1980).

Gleason (1969: 11) stated:

The generation now entering society as young adults
hardly even remembers the period of "Protestant-catholic
tensions" in the early 1950's - to say nothing of the Ku
Klux Klan of Al Smith days - but it does remember that
John F. Kennedy was a catholic who became President of
the United States. Hence, these young people have
little reason to think of themselves as a minority
threatened by the society around them, but good reason
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to believe that they are pretty much the same kind of
Americans as everyone else. It is not surprising that
they seem to wonder why older Catholics thought
·
otherwise, that they question the need for separate
Catholic schools or societies, or that they ask why
Catholics should have different views from other men of
good will on such matters as divorce or abortion.
After World war II, then, the parish began to lose its
relevance as a source to solve their problems.

Higher

education and suburban living, with its more individualistic
lifestyles than those of the urban immigrant neighborhoods,
exposed Catholic children to a more secular world than their·
parents had known (Dolan and Leege, 1985).

"At best, the

parish was a source of indirect help" (Leege, 1986: 6).
Upward mobility, suburbanization, and education broke the
bonds between the catholic institution and its members and
encouraged them to seek other answers to religious
questions.
Secularized Society 8
In order to understand American Catholics after they
assimilated, it is necessary to understand the religious
behavior of the dominant society to which they joined.

As

mainstream Americans, Catholics' behavior would be
influenced by the same social forces and events as other
Americans.

This is especially evident in light of the fact

that many of the mainstream Protestant churches were

Br prefer the term "secularized" to "secular," as the
latter is often used in a negative, emotionally loaded
manner (Wilson, 1979; 1985).
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experiencing the same phenomena as the catholics (drops in
attendance and selective believing).

Thus, much of the

causes of selective Catholicism can be attributed to general
cultural influences, since other churches were similarly
affected (Roof and McKinney, 1987).
What kind of religious environment was awaiting
Catholics when they assimilated?

The culture which

educated, suburban Catholics confronted was secularized.
Religion had been relegated to the "private sphere" with
very little influence over public life.
Individuals' detachment from religious institutions
occurred because religion was declining as a social force,
according to secularization theory.

Secularization theory

proposes a
decline in the significance of religion in the operation
of the social system, its diminished significance in
social consciousness, and its reduced command over the
resources (time, energy, skill, intellect, imagination,
and accumulated wealth) of mankind (Wilson, 1985: 14).
In modern society, science, rationalization, and secular law
have subsumed many of religion's traditional functions.
The body of secularization theory is immense, 9 and
contains many different versions of the relationship between
religion and modern society.

There are, however, several

dominant theoretical themes which run throughout the

9In fact, according to Wilson (1985), the discipline of
sociology was originally founded to explain the decline of
religion and the rise of rationalism in modern Western
society.
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literature (Shiner, 1967).

One theme is society's

withdrawal from religion's influence, whether that results
from outright rejection of religious symbols and
understandings, or an attempt by society to reformulate the
understanding of society as a human construction apart from
the divine.

The former explanation is often accompanied,

according to Shiner (1967), by the prediction of a totally
non-religious society.

The latter explanation predicts the

survival of religion, but restricted to private life.
Another dominant theme explains the decline of religion's
influence through a "desacralization of the world" (Shiner,
1967: 215), as sacred explanations no longer suffice to
explain the universe in light of natural and social science.
Still another theme emphasizes a growth of attention to the
human rather than the supernatural world.

Finally, another

version proposes that "knowledge, patterns of behavior, and
institutional arrangements which were once understood as
grounded in divine power are transformed into phenomena of
purely human creation and responsibility" (Shiner, 1967:
214).
These themes are complementary and each probably
explains a part of the whole phenomenon of secularization.
But the one which is particularly pertinent in discussing
American catholics' selective style of believing is
privatization: society's relegation of religion to the
sphere of private life.

In modern Western society religion
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exists in a self-contained sphere, having only tenuous
connections with it.

For Berger (1969), religion is present

in the most public and the most private spheres of society,
but nowhere else.
Religion manifests itself as public rhetoric and private
virtue. In other words, insofar as religion is common,
it lacks "reality," and insofar as it is real it lacks
commonality. This situation represents a severe rupture
of the traditional task of religion, which was precisely
the establishment of an integrated set of definitions of
reality that could serve as a common universe of meaning
for the members of a society (Berger, 1969: 134).
This privatization, or relegation of religion to the private
sphere, occurred as various institutions in the west came to
specialize in specific segments of the society, e.g.
economics, law, medicine, etc. (Luckmann, 1967).

Religion

became mere public rhetoric as this "institutional
specialization" (Luckmann, 1967: 39) made one encompassing
system of meaning impractical for both the society and the
individual.

"Even for those who continue to be socialized

into [a religion], specifically religious representations
tend to have a predominately rhetorical status" (Luckmann,
1967: 99-100).

Modern society's institutional

specialization relativizes religious content.
Privatization of religion causes selective Catholicism
because, when the "reality" of religion exists only in the
private sphere, it develops many of the characteristics of
the market (Berger, 1969; Luckmann, 1967).

No longer having

influence over the total society or being able exclusively
to provide a system of ultimate meaning, religion must
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compete with other spheres to establish its definitions of
reality.

Individuals likewise become religious consumers.

"This is the crucial sociological and social-psychological
characteristics of the pluralistic situation" (Berger, 1969:
145).

As consumers, religious believers' tastes will

change.

They will choose religions which meet their latest

desires.
This consumerist behavior, coupled with the difficulty
which institutional specialization poses for a system of
ultimate meaning, leads to selective believing.

Luckmann

(1967: 102) states that
The assortment of religious representations - a sacred
cosmos in a loose sense of the term only - is not
internalized by any potential consumer as a whole. The
"autonomous" consumer selects, instead, certain
religious themes from the available assortment and
builds them into a somewhat precarious private system of
"ultimate" significance. Individual religiosity is thus
no longer a replica or approximation of an "official"
model.
Secularization theory, especially privatization
theory, then, can address the selective tendencies of
American Catholics.

Religion has little influence over the

rest of society if it is relegated to the private sphere.
Nor can it dictate the behavior of individuals.

This is the

social environment American Catholics moved into when they
broke the bonds with the immigrant cultures.

They had

already weakened their attachment to the Church by
withdrawing from the immigrant culture.

The society into

which they moved facilitated a weak role for, and
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consequently weak attachment to, religion.
Cultural Changes: The Rise of Individualism
What kind of environment did Catholics experience
afterward?

The latter half of the twentieth century was a

time of tremendous cultural change for American society at
large.

The late 1960s and the 1970s experienced a cultural

change to a radical type of individualism.

For the

mainstream religious community, the new individualism meant
a decline in membership as individuals sought to establish
their own personal religions (Roof and McKinney, 1987).

rt

also reinforced selective behavior among those who remained
members of mainstream churches.
Bellah, et al.: "Sheilaism"
Bellah and his colleagues (Bellah, et al., 1985),
document a new, stronger cultural emphasis on the individual
self in American society than the individualism inherent in
privatized religion.

This new individualism appeared during

the late 1960s and 1970s, the tail end of Catholic
assimilation.

It represented another social condition in

addition to the privatized religion, in which American
Catholics found themselves shortly after leaving the
immigrant Church.
Bellah, et al. (1985) speak of "the therapeutic
attitude" dominating American culture and especially
prominent in the thinking and behavior of middle-class
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Americans.

This attitude emphasizes self-realization over

interpersonal and societal commitment.

The individual owes

nothing to another person or organization unless she
receives subjective satisfaction from them.

Relationships

are governed by one social mos: individuals must protect
their self-interests by communicating their feelings and
assessments of the other.

Permanence in relationships and

commitments cannot "be grounded in something larger than the
satisfactions provided by the relationship itself" (Bellah,
et al., 1985: 107).

In brief, relationships are fragile;

"attachment" is not valued for itself or social
prescriptions requiring it, but for the personal fulfillment
it might bring.
The authors point to two social consequences of the
therapeutic attitude which apply to religion.

First, what

might be termed a macrosociological effect, is a tendency to
maintain the social-structural status quo.

The focus for

all change rests almost exclusively on the individual.
Change occurs in individuals within the structures of
society, but without actually affecting them.

Church

members, their attention focused on their "inner selves,"
seek to transform themselves independently of transforming
their church.

This is precisely the result of selective

Catholicism, as lay Catholics concentrate on maintaining
their personal faiths and ignore Church structure.

If the

formal Church structure is to change, it will have to be
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changed by the hierarchy.
Placing the emphasis for change on the individual
partially gives rise to the second consequence of the
therapeutic attitude in religion:
private religions.
history.

the development of

The other contributor is American

Bellah, et al., like secularization theorists,

describe the history of American religion as a history of
privatization.

Slowly, the degree of religious influence

began to shrink during the nineteenth century.

The moral

consensus and harmony which religion sought to bestow on
colonial America became limited to a sphere unto itself.
Religion became a haven within a heartless world.

The

transformation of privatized religion to private religion
began with American individualism, especially that found
among the evangelical sects, but received its fullest
expression with the advent of the therapeutic attitude.
Present day Americans pride themselves on forming their own
religious beliefs apart from the teachings of any organized
church.

For Bellah, et al. (1985: 221), "this suggests the

possibility of over 220 million American religions."

Thus,

they describe the individualistic religious practices of a
subject named Sheila as "Sheilaism."
Roof and McKinney: A Synthesis
Roof and McKinney (1987) synthesize the concepts of
religion's declining sphere of influence with the
development of a new culture of individualism in a detailed
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historical account.

They explain that private religiosity

is a characteristic shared by members of all American
mainstream religions.

It developed as the role of religion

in American culture changed during the twentieth century.
The authors posit a declining influence of a common,
religiously based American outlook.

As dominant religious

ideas and social realities diverged in the 1960s, the link
between religion and culture broke.

By then religion could

no longer explain tpe events of the day nor forge a national
moral consensus.

Mainstream religions' inability to forge

national consensus eventually resulted in their inability to
forge consensus within the churches.
Up to the early twentieth century, the Protestantism
of white Anglo-Saxons was the only legitimate American
religion.
culture.

And it dictated much of the substance of American
The immigrants' religions, especially Catholicism

and Judaism, were deviant and membership was considered
unpatriotic.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Americans began to

tolerate the non-WASP religions, and religious pluralism
pervaded.

But the link of religion and culture did not

dissolve with the advent of pluralism.

The exclusivist

tendencies of Protestantism, catholicism, and Judaism were
downplayed in favor of a national "civic piety," which
stressed the "more inclusive, more universal elements of
national faith" (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 36).

It was a

"broadly based moral consensus" on such matters as
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"premarital chastity, marital fidelity, the undesirability
of divorce, and traditional understandings of family life
and gender roles" (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 37).

It also

included common ideals for the nation and American citizens,
including "patriotism, conformity, capitalism, hard work,
success, [and] familism" (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 28).
This civic piety was largely influenced by the Puritanical
Protestant attitudes which had previously dominated American
culture, but was widely espoused across denominational
lines. 10
The new link between religion and culture was
inherently fragile in an increasingly complex society.

In

order to have meaning for members of various faiths, the
civic piety lacked explicitly religious substance, and
conveyed more secular attitudes.

Modern capitalism, in the

meantime, produced larger, more bureaucratic, and more
numerous institutions which dominated public life.

In the

face of these social forces,
the very notion of a mainstream set of values had become
problematic. With greater institutional differentiation
and societal complexity, the churches came to have
little persuasive power over the bureaucratic giants.
Increasingly the public sector was governed by a largely
unrestricted interplay of economic forces, which seemed
impervious to individual religious and altruistic
motives. Indeed, in a world of huge economic
conglomerates and multinational corporations, it
lOThe rise of religious pluralism itself had an effect
on American Catholics, according to Roof and McKinney
(1987). I deal with this aspect of the American Catholic
experience below in the discussion of the institutional
changes within the church.
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appeared unlikely that religion could sustain any deep
consensus of faith and values (Roof and McKinney, 1987:
2 9) •

The civic piety, however delicate, survived through the
1950s because of other prevailing social situations.

Post-

war affluence endorsed the optimism shared across the
denominations.

Furthermore, the Cold War validated a need

for shared definitions of patriotism and national consensus.
Mainstream churches, the channels of the shared national
"faith," thrived.
The bond between religion and culture broke in the
1960s and 1970s when social events contradicted the
religious context.

Reasons for optimism and national

consensus disappeared with the Vietnam war, urban rioting,
and poverty's stubborn prevalence despite massive welfare
efforts.

Americans, already facing an economically complex

society, were confronted with contradiction.

America had

serious problems and the traditional national faith seemed
unable to respond.

The Watergate scandal was the final

"precipitating event" to break the influence of the civic
piety.

"By that time the old civil faith embodying national

ideals and messianic conceptions of America as an instrument
of divine purpose had lost much of its force" (Roof and
McKinney, 1987: 28). Not only were the problems too complex,
they defied the shared definitions of society.
The disconnection of religion and culture led to
another dominant twentieth-century characteristic,
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individualism.

Without shared ideals, the individual must

search for ideals and meaning himself.

Roof and McKinney

describe individuals' search for meaning as a "quest" for
self-fulfillment.

And the affluence of the 1960s and early

1970s allowed Americans to pursue their quest with great
intensity.

Subsistence was not a problem for most people.

These individualistic quests for meaning touched religious
organizations.

As common ideals declined so did the ability

of mainstream religions, a source of those values, to
reforge them.

Believers emphasized the primacy of the self

over institutions and socially ascribed statuses.

This

"reinforced the view that religious institutions should
serve individuals and not vice-versa" (Roof and McKinney,
1987: 50).

It also reinforced the cultural attitude of

voluntarism, that a person adhere to a particular belief
because by choice, and not because of family or ethnic group
background.

In short, after the 1960s and 1970s:

Americans generally hold a respectful attitude toward
religion, but also they increasingly regard it as a
matter of personal choice or preference. Today choice
means more than simply having an option among religious
alternatives; it involves religion as an option itself
and opportunity to draw selectively off a variety of
traditions in the pursuit of the self ... Questions of
authority, discipline, practice, and common life often
seem foreign, or at least secondary (Roof and McKinney,
1987: 40).
By 1978, Gallup polls showed that 81 percent of Americans
agreed that an individual should "arrive at his or her own
religious beliefs independent of a church or synagogue."
That percentage broke down into 71 percent of church members
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and 86 percent of non-members (Roof and McKinney, 1987: 57).
Conclusion
During the twentieth century, American Catholics grew
apart from the immigrant cultures which centered around the
Church.

Their socioeconomic and social-psychological needs

for attachment to the Church diminished.

They now belonged

to secularized mainstream society which itself had
privatized religion.

In this environment, the force of

religion had diminished to rhetoric.

American Catholics

became like other mainstream American believers: "religious
consumers," picking and choosing, according to their own
criteria, among the items they liked.

This tendency was all

the more exacerbated when American culture spawned a radical
individualism in the 1960s and 1970s which asserted the
primacy of individual judgment over institutional
prescriptions.
This chapter dealt with the social sources of
selective catholicism.

But the assimilation of American

Catholics into the mainstream, secularized society explains
only part of the phenomenon, namely the rise of "pick and
choose" believing.

These changes do not explain how the

hierarchical, authoritarian Church
behave to remain active members.

permit~

catholics who so

Thus the focus of this

review must turn from the society to the religious
organization itself.
The next two chapters discuss both how the Church came
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to accommodate selective Catholicism, and how institutional
changes imposed by American society and from within the
organization actually encouraged selective Catholicism's
development.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: VOLUNTARIZATION
FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT
Up to now I have spoken primarily of the collectivity
of the laity.

But the catholic Church also represents a

highly structured bureaucracy with officers (the hierarchy)
serving as its leaders.

The existence of this aspect of the

Church, which I've referred to as the "institutional
Church," is difficult to overlook.

The Roman Catholic

Church is an institutional, financial, and political
reality.

The Pope and the Roman Curia promulgate official

dogmatic and moral teachings.

The American bishops draft

position statements on nuclear war and the economy in the
name of the American Church.

Nonetheless, when discussing

the detached state of the laity, the possibility of
overlooking the institution increases.

Since the laity are

ignoring the hierarchy, the temptation exists for the
analyst to do so.

One must remember that no matter how

detached the laity may be, the institution is a social
reality.

Thus, there must have been changes in the

institution which permitted the practice of selective
Catholicism.
The catholic institution has been as subject to change
in the twentieth century as individual American catholics.
This has occurred both in the ways in which American society
40
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defined the Church and in the ways the Church defined
itself.

The former occurred early in the twentieth century

when the dominant society stopped treating the Catholic
Church as deviant.

American society bestowed upon the

Church equal status with mainstream Protestantism and with
Judaism.

In the eyes of American society, the Church could

legitimately claim to be the Church no longer.
among equals (Roof and McKinney, 1987).

It was one

The latter change

occurred in the 1960s when the Church turned its attention
upon itself during the Second Vatican Council.

The Council

officially endorsed the equality of the laity while
reinforcing the hierarchical status quo.
These changes occurred simultaneously with the
weakening of individuals' attachment and ascriptive ties to
the Church.

They represented an organizational change from

a total to a voluntary organization.

Thus, just when

various social changes influenced American catholics to
attribute their Church membership to individual choice
rather than ascriptive ties (Roof and McKinney, 1987), the
Church itself became a voluntary organization.

The first

change, bestowed by the American society, externally
voluntarized catholicism for those who moved away from the
immigrant communities in the first third of the century.
They could approach Catholicism as one choice among many.
The second change, Vatican II, did not in itself voluntarize
the institution.

It was, rather, the laity's selective
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interpretation of new definitions of their role in the
Church which internally voluntarized the Church for the
laity, if not in the eyes of the hierarchy.

After Vatican

II, American lay people felt that they could legitimately
practice "pick and choose" believing within the Catholic
Church.
"Denominationalization"
Economic and demographic changes during the twentieth
century assimilated Catholic lay people to American society.
At the same time, the developing tolerance of religious
pluralism assimilated the catholic institution.

As noted

above, the religious, if not the cultural, hegemony of
white, Anglo-Saxon Protestantism gave way to tolerance of
Catholicism, Judaism, and other mainstream Protestant faiths
in the 1920s and 1930s.

The observance of "E Pluribus Unum"

stretched to include different religions (Roof and McKinney,
1987) 11 .
Tolerance of several religions requires not only
mutual respect but accommodation.

Many Americans therefore

downplayed the exclusivist teachings of their respective
11 Hennesey (1981: 235) describes the high rate of
participation by American Catholics in World War I (about
one million of the over 4.9 million soldiers) as "their
first extended experience of inter-religious cooperation."
catholics' participation in the war may have played a role
in Protestants' acceptance of them. In addition, the
federal limits on immigration speeded acceptance of
Catholics. Distrust of immigrants had often caused tension
between catholics and Protestants (Hudson, 1981).

43

religions.

As a condition for their acceptance, American

religions had "to accept coexistence with others and ... glve
up claims of authority over them" (Roof and McKinney, 1987:
34). 12 The newly legitimized faiths lost their status as
"religions" and were "denominationalized" (Roof and
McKinney, 1987: 34). Eventually they were accepted
equally. 13 Belonging to one was, apart from socioeconomic
and ethnic differences, much the same as belonging to
another.

The Catholic hierarchy may have continued to

assert its claims to exclusive truth, but such assertions
were perceived as unrealistic by the Americanized laity.
Thus the hierarchy and the laity defined the Church
differently.
Vatican II
These differences in definitions of the Church would
continue even after an ecumenical council.

In the midst of

the socioeconomic, demographic, and cultural changes, the
global Church's hierarchy subjected the institution to
intense scrutiny and change.

The Second Vatican Council

12 This of course applied to those religions seeking
equality as a mainstream religion. Religious sects and
ethnic religious groups would not have downplayed
exclusivist teachings because they did not wish to be
accepted by the dominant culture (Finke, 1988). Thus, some
ethnic parishes may not have been "denominationalized."
13 Although tolerance of Catholicism may have begun in
the 1920s and 1930s, much overt anti-Catholic prejudice
persisted through the 1950s to the election of a Catholic
President.
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reformed the liturgy, renamed some of the sacraments to
emphasize different theological aspects, and changed the way
people looked at the Church.

It emphasized ecumenism for

the first time, thus perhaps internally legitimizing, or at
least accepting, the Church's equality with other religions.
Practices in effect for a millennium were changed (Hennesey,
1981).

Gallup and Castelli (1987: 1) call the Second

Vatican Council "the dominant fact in twentieth-century
Catholicism."
There have traditionally been two ways of viewing the
impact of Vatican II on American Catholics: "One faction
argues that the Council ruined the Church, and the other
that it saved the Church from disaster a little later"
(Hoge, 1986: 291).

Within each perspective, I feel, lies

part of the explanation as to how the Council both
influenced the development of selective catholicism and
influenced selective catholics to choose to remain active in
the Church.
Vatican II as Damaging the Church
Exemplifying the former criticism, conservative
Catholics argued that the sheer number and rapidity of
changes instituted by the Council angered and alienated
Catholics, who turned away from the Church as a result
(Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt, 1976).
this viewpoint is Kelley (1972).

Another example of

For Kelley, Vatican II

modernized and thrust the Church's rituals and customs into
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the religious mainstream.

This for Kelley is the beginning

of the end for any religion.

Thus the Catholic declines in

the late 1960s and the 1970s are directly attributable to
the modernizing effects of Vatican II.
But a slightly modified viewpoint that Vatican II
damaged the Church contends that the hierarchy's failure to
follow through with expected reforms of Vatican II spelled
disaster for the Church (Fichter, 1977; Dulles, 1981; Kim,
1980; and Osborne, 1969).

Vatican II prescribed both

personal, spiritual reform and structural, institutional
reform.

Osborne (1969) distinguished between these

different levels of reform by terming them "religious" and
"ecclesiastical" reform, respectively.

"Religious" reform

refers to change in individuals: in the ways they think and
behave.

"Ecclesiastic" reform is change in the structure of

the Church.

According to Fichter (1977), it was widely

assumed that the Council's intent was to spark "religious"
reform by effecting "ecclesiastic" reform.

But after the

Council, the institutional Church facilitated only personal
"religious" reform.

Fichter (1977: 157) states that

the original expectations [that "religious" and
"ecclesiastic" reform occur simultaneously] have
diminished, and the enthusiasm has waned, because the
promised [structural] adaptation has not occurred, or
because where it was attempted the pace of change was
extremely slow.
After Vatican II catholics found themselves unable "to form
an image of the church into which they can plausibly fit
what they think they ought to be doing" (Dulles, 1981: 10).

46

Kim (1980) and Osborne (1969) attribute the declines
in catholic attendance during the 1960s and 1970s to the
fact that revolutionary changes in American Catholics' ways
of thinking and believing were not accompanied by similarly
revolutionary changes in Church structure.

The hierarchical

structure of the Catholic Church translates into upward
accountability.

Priests are accountable to their bishops

and not, at least formally, to their parishioners.

This

theoretically allows priests to continue to propagate the
teachings of the Church hierarchy, regardless of the
popularity with lay Catholics. 14

And theoretically, lay

Catholics who disagree could leave (Kim, 1980).

Those

Catholics strongly committed to pluralism as a method of
operation within the Church left when they found the rigid
structures of the Church would not facilitate it.
Although each of these authors recognizes that the
hierarchy failed to follow through with proposed changes,
all but Dulles (1981) place too much emphasis on the
hierarchy's actions after the Council.

Vatican II did

redefine the Church, but it left the door to traditional,
hierarchical understandings of the Church open.

For Dulles

(1981), the negative reaction to the hierarchy's failure to
act according to the new definitions is as much a result of
14 Two studies (Greeley, 1973; Leege, 1988) have shown
that Kim (1980) and Osborne's (1969) understanding of the
priests' role in Church teaching is incorrect. I address
these studies in the next chapter.
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the laity's narrow reading of Vatican II as the hierarchy's
narrow implementation of it. On one hand, the Council
defined the Church as the egalitarian "People of God."

For

instance, The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen
Gentium) states:
The whole body of the faithful who have an anointing
that comes from the holy one (cf. 1 Jn. 2:20 and 27)
cannot err in matters of belief. This characteristic is
shown in the supernatural appreciation of the faith
(sensus fidei) of the whole people, when, "from the
bishops to the last of the faithful" they manifest a
universal consent in matters of faith and morals.
(Quoted in Flannery, 1975: 363.)
There is a clear sense in the above passage that the laity
share in discerning matters of faith together with the
hierarchy.
equality.

It conveys meanings of co-responsibility and
Furthermore, many other conciliar statements

endorsed the primacy of lay people's individual consciences
in forming their beliefs.
On the other hand, the Council Fathers restate the
primacy of the hierarchy over the laity in matters of faith
and morals, and reassert that they "differ essentially and
not only in degree" (in Flannery, 1975: 361).

Another

example can be found in the same text in which the Council
stresses collegiality among all the bishops:
The college or body of bishops has ... no authority
unless united with the Roman Pontiff, Peter's successor,
as its head, whose primatial authority, let it be added,
over all, whether pastors or faithful, remains in its
integrity. For the Roman Pontiff, by reason of his
office as Vicar of Christ, namely, and as pastor of the
entire Church, has full, supreme, and universal power
over the whole Church, a power which he can always
exercise unhindered. The order of bishops is the
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successor to the college of apostles in their role as
teachers and pastors, and in it the apostolic college is
perpetuated. Together with their head, the Supreme ·
Pontiff, and never apart from him, they have supreme and
full authority over the universal Church; but this power
cannot be exercised without the agreement of the Roman
Pontiff. (Quoted in Flannery, 1975: 375.)
This, although more moderate in tone, is more than vaguely
similar to the 1870 Dogmatic Constitution of Papal
Infallibility from Vatican I:
Hence we teach and declare that by appointment of our
Lord the Roman Church possesses a superiority of
ordinar1 power over all other Churches, and that this
power o jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is
truly episcopal is immediate; to which all, of whatever
rite and dignity, both pastors and faithful, both
individually and collectively, are bound by their duty
of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, to
submit, not only in matters which pertain to faith and
morals, but also in those that pertain to the discipline
and government of the Church throughout the world, so
that the Church of Christ may be one flock under one
supreme pastor through the preservation of unity both of
communion and profession of the same faith with the
Roman Pontiff. This is the teaching of catholic truth,
from which no one can deviate without loss of faith and
of salvation. (Quoted in Neuner, Roos, and Rahner, 1967:
224-225.)

Dulles (1981) recognizes Vatican II's dual emphasis on a new
definition of the Church and a redefinition of the
hierarchical status quo.

Dulles feels that progressive lay

people focused exclusively on the new definitions and
assumed that everyone else did as well.
the other hand, focused on the old.

The hierarchy, on

Eacn faction accused

the other of misinterpreting and, in Dulles' (1981: 14)
words "contradicting the Council."

The result was a

polarization and an alienation of many lay Catholics
resulting in drops in attendance, religious vocations, and
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acceptance of Church teachings (Dulles, 1981).
In the absence of structural change, American
Catholics pursued personal religious renewal.

They believed

that if the Church was not going to meet their expectations,
they would have to meet their own.

Hence the growth of lay

movements emphasizing personal spirituality (the charismatic
and Cursillo movements, for example) at the same time many
catholics were loosening their attachments with the
institutional Church (Dulles, 1981).
Vatican II as Mitigating Damage
A second view of Vatican II's effects contends that
the Council did not create a crisis but attenuated one.

For

Hoge (1986), the rapid acceptance of Vatican II's emphasis
on collegiality and consensus occurred because American
Catholics were waiting for it.

He states that the Council

legitimized and directed changes in the Church, pressure for
which had been building for many years.

Although he does

not explicitly subscribe to either of the two viewpoints on
Vatican II's effects stated above, his model of the dam and
the river seems to convey that Vatican II saved the American
Church from later disaster.

Had it not released the pent-up

energy, the institutional dam may have burst under the
pressure of the lay desire for change, resulting in an even
greater abandonment of the Church.
Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt (1976) attempted to test
the effects of Vatican II empirically.

For them, the
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"dominant fact of twentieth-century Catholicism" was not
Vatican II but the 1968 papal encyclical Humanae Vitae,
which reaffirmed the Church's disapproval of artificial
contraception.

They found that satisfaction with Vatican II

slightly mediated the declines in religious devotion which
correlated with lay rejection of the encyclical.

In their

model, Greeley, Mccready and Mccourt predict that had
Vatican II not occurred, religious declines after 1968 would
have been greater.

They conclude that Vatican II did not

contribute to the decline by building up hopes for change.
catholics' prior use of oral contraceptives would have meant
rejection of Humanae Vitae and declines in religious
devotion with or without the Council.

Vatican II somewhat

eased the decline, allowing some Catholics to practice birth
control while participating in the Church.
Conclusion
I suggest that Dulles (1981) and Greeley, Mccready and
Mccourt (1976) each tell part of the story of Vatican II's
effect on American Catholics.

Dulles emphasizes

differential interpretations of Vatican II, but Greeley,
Mccready and McCourt's perspective of the Council's effect
may be more realistic.

Those aspects of Vatican II which

appealed to the laity, specifically equality with the
hierarchy and an emphasis on conscience, may have prevented
more Catholics from leaving.

Those who voted with their

feet may have been the most attached.

They could not
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tolerate a hierarchy which differed from their views of the
Church.

For those less attached, Vatican II may have

prevented further defections.

It offered the American laity

what they were ready to hear (Hoge, 1986) and
institutionalized change in the (previously) changeless
Church (Kim, 1980).

Their interpretation of Vatican II

therefore was enough to counter what many didn't like in the
Church.

That it also strived to maintain the hierarchical

status quo and that the hierarchy ignored a new emphasis of
collegiality and quasi-democratic reforms was probably
irrelevant to less attached lay people.

Having joined the

American culture and placing their religion at the periphery
of their social lives, it was possible to concentrate on the
elements with which they agreed and anticipate change of
those with which they didn't.
This scenario may represent selective Catholicism's
beginning.

In the social context, American catholics were

just joining the American mainstream, in which most church
members were "religious consumers," picking and choosing
among the items they liked.

Catholics picked and chose

among what Vatican II had to offer.
This selective attraction to Vatican II itself may
have reinforced further selective catholicism after the dawn
of radical individualism in the late 1960s.

The laity's

stress of their equality with the hierarchy and the primacy
of individual conscience, which they perceived that Vatican
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II bestowed, may have endorsed an independence from the
hierarchy in the pursuit of private religion.

In other

words, the laity's interpretation of Vatican II may have led
them to believe that Catholicism permitted, practically and
legally, private religions.

(The sociological axiom is that

a situation which is perceived as real is real.)

If the

hierarchy taught otherwise, the laity could retort with
their understanding of the Council.

Individualistic

believing was the American norm, and had Vatican II not
facilitated it, even through selective lay interpretation,
most American Catholics probably would have turned
elsewhere.
In brief, "denominationalization," along with other
social changes, made Catholicism a voluntary organization
externally.

catholicism was perceived as no better than any

other mainstream religion in America.

The internal

voluntarization originally sparked by Vatican II encouraged
American Catholics to choose Catholicism over other
religions, by allowing them to maintain their selective
method of participating in it.

THE ROLE OF THE PARISH
The paradox of selective Catholicism is the laity's
loyalty, which they express in the form of steady local
participation in it.

This occurs for two reasons.

On the

one hand, catholics encounter tolerant parish priests who
espouse many of the same attitudes as they.

Greeley (1973)

found that by 1970, 71 percent of active diocesan priests
rejected the principle that all artificial contraception is
wrong.

This represented an increase of 11 percent since the

conclusion of the Council in 1965.

Meanwhile, the hierarchy

remained virtually unchanged as only 25 percent dissented in
1965 and 30 percent in 1970.

Leege (1988) found that parish

priests are as tolerant, and perhaps even more tolerant,
than lay people of variations in lay behavior and attitudes,
except for irregular Mass attendance.

To put it bluntly, he

discovered that parish priests generally tolerate selective
catholicism.
Leege's (1988) explanation for priests' tolerance lies
in their location of professional leadership in the parish
organization.

They are trained to teach the Church's

precepts, but their job is to offer the sacrament of
forgiveness to all, no matter what precepts are "disobeyed.''
From their position, they may believe that those who break
the Church's precepts are more in need of the Church's
53
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forgiveness than those who don't.
On the other hand, the parishes acted as the medium
through which Vatican II prevented further withdrawals from
the Church.

They allowed the laity to actively pursue

democratic and participatory ideals they valued and felt
Vatican II espoused.

Post-Vatican II parishes instituted

participatory liturgies, parish councils, and a multitude of
new non-worship programs (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987).
In fact, the degree to which a parish establishes Vatican II
reforms is directly related to parishioner participation
(Cieslak, 1984) 15 and satisfaction (Searle and Leege,
1985b).

The northeastern U.S. dioceses, whose parishes

institute conciliar reforms less than others, have the
lowest attendance rates (Roof and McKinney, 1987).
After Vatican II, most parishes allowed the laity to
play an active role in their affairs.

As a result, the

Notre Dame Study found that almost half the laity now
participate in a non-worship activity.

Pastors indicated to

the Notre Dame researchers that lay participation in worship
and other programs is the key to parish vitality.

And 30

percent of U.S. parishes now employ a lay person as a
pastoral minister (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987).

These

15 cieslak (1984) found that the relationship between
Vatican II reforms and parishioner participation held for
small and medium-sized parishes, but was much weaker in
large parishes. He reasons that large parishes by their
nature have many programs to appeal to parishioners' various
tastes, whether or not they directly respond to Vatican II.
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changes both result from and encourage lay enthusiasm about
the parish (Cieslak, 1984).
The conciliar reforms which probably most encouraged
the laity to remain active in the parish are those affecting
the Mass.

The Notre Dame Study revealed a "liturgical

smogasboard" (sic.) (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987: 132)
within U.S. parishes, a pluralism to appeal to different
tastes.

This has encouraged most active Catholics to remain

in their neighborhood parish rather than seek out an
alternative.
Organizational Consequences
As American catholics were assimilated into mainstream
American culture, two distinct visions of the Church
evolved.

At the bottom, "Americanized" lay people began to

favor a more democratic and participatory Church.

At the

top, the hierarchy continued to favor the authoritarian
structure.

Vatican II perpetuated this by simultaneously

defining the Church as the People of God sharing
responsibility, and as the hierarchical structure in which
responsibility and power remain at the top.

The laity

focused on the Council's new definitions of the Church and
the hierarchy stressed its maintenance of the old.
The combined effects of selective Catholicism and
conciliar reforms made these dual visions reality.

While

selective catholicism both results from and signifies
detachment from the Church, Vatican II's potential for
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democracy and lay participation prevented many catholics
from detaching completely.

Assimilation, individualism, and

a selective understanding of Vatican II influenced American
Catholics to deny the Church's teaching authority in favor
of individual conscience.

But many parishes, through

participatory liturgies and programs, facilitated their
post-conciliar visions of the Church.

This explains

selective Catholics' continued participation and loyalty
despite their rejection of many of the Church's teachings.
The Church as a social organization, then, has two
distinct levels.

There are now two Catholicisms: (1) the

institutional Church consisting of the hierarchy, and (2)
the relatively autonomous parishes consisting of lay people
who believe and participate selectively.

Selective

Catholics literally don't care about what the Pope and the
bishops might think or teach (Greeley and Durkin, 1984).
Their rejection of the hierarchy's teachings severed their
attachment with the international Church.

But they are

still somewhat attached to the Church at the parish level
because there they can participate in liturgy, activities,
and parish administration as they prefer.
This description of the contemporary Church must, of
course, be qualified.

First, although immigrant Catholics'

lives centered much more on the parish, there was no gulf
between the parish and the Church's teaching authority.
Catholic Church from the Reformation to the First Vatican

The
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Council closely approximated the Weberian ideal-type of
bureaucracy (Dann, 1976). 16 In the U.S., this bureaucratic
character probably persisted beyond Vatican I through the
first half of the twentieth century, as uniformity of belief
and practice offered protection against the dominant
culture. 17 Being a Catholic meant "assent" to the will of
the hierarchy.

The laity mostly accepted the beliefs,

attitudes, and practices the hierarchy prescribed (Dann,
1976).

In the parishes, lay participation was minimal

(especially in the Latin Mass), pastors controlled the
administration, and priests generally did not disagree with
the hierarchy (Greeley, 1973).
Second, contemporary catholics' "attachment" to the
parish must be understood within the context of private
religion.

Selective Catholics' participation in the church

includes little religious interaction with fellow believers.
If the Church occupies only the limited private sphere,
there is no need for strong religious community.

The

church's privatized position of non-influence among its
members' institutional commitments discourages much
interaction among them.

In brief, the importance of

interacting with fellow members of the institution has no
16 According to Dann (1976), bureaucratic organization is
actually an aberration within the history of Catholicism.
Prior to the Reformation, pluralism was more often the rule.
17 This is often one argument used to explain the idealtype bureaucratic nature of the Catholic Church in Poland,
as well as other Eastern Block nations.
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priority among selective Catholics because the institutional
church has no strong priority in their lives.
That active catholics lack strong attachment to their
parishes became clear from the Notre Dame study.

Most

Catholics have few close friends who belong to the same
parish but have many friends who are not Catholic
(Gremillion and Castelli, 1987).

This is significant since

informal association among fellow members encourages
attachment to a voluntary organization (Lipset, Trow and
Coleman, 1956).

Furthermore, American Catholics have

infrequent contact with the pastor, and, as I stated in
Chapter II, feel the parish does not meet many of their
"social needs" (Gremillion and Castelli, 1987). As for
participation in the Mass, Searle and Leege (1985b: 6)
conclude that
the liturgy does a reasonably good job of providing most
Catholics with a recognizable place of encounter with
God, even if it is not always clear that it is an
encounter with God shared corporately, i.e. in the body
of the church.
In another study, utendorf (1985) discovered that primary
motivations for attending lay ministry training programs are
individualistic in nature.

Dixon and Hoge (1979) discovered

that suburban lay people ranked individualistic needs
(education and counseling) as the highest priorities of the
parish.

Their top communal priority ranked fifth out of

twenty-one.

Finally, the parish structure itself may lead

to weak attachment, since "as parishes offer more programs,
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parish life tends to become more fragmented" (Gremillion and
Castelli, 1987: 70).
To complete the circle, the selective nature of
believing, which in part results from institutional
detachment, itself further discourages interaction.

As Roof

and McKinney (1987: 56) state,
one could say that the enemy of church life in this
country is not so much "secularity" as it is "do-ityourself religiosity." The latter fosters a highly
personalized mode of faith which undercuts the
integrality of the church and synagogue.
"Do-it-yourself religiosity," or selective Catholicism,
denies a commonality of belief among believers.

With

individuals forging their own faiths, there is little in
common to share.

Selective Catholicism, then, represents

religious individualism not only in the selecting of church
teachings to follow, but in the lack of interaction among
its members.
In brief, actively participating in a parish no longer
implies strong attachment to the Church.

It therefore does

not indicate uniform acceptance of the hierarchy's
teachings.

The laity's participation today differs from

their participation in the immigrant Church.

Most parishes

no longer serve as a communications medium for the
hierarchy.

They serve, rather, primarily as a medium for

instituting the changes of Vatican II and for the laity's
pursuit of selective Catholicism.

Participation in the

parish may be solid, but the laity participate because they
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choose to (it appeals to them) and on condition that
ultimate authority rests with the individual.

The hierarchy

today, unlike in the immigrant Church, is by and large
separated from the parish.

In this context, selective

Catholics' participation and loyalty to the Church does not
seem so much a paradox.

As Greeley (1977: 128) states, it

is a loyalty "transformed" from that of their grandparents.
The Future of the Catholic Organization
A question which lingers is whether this
organizational scheme will survive in light of recent
Vatican "crackdowns" on theological, moral, and
administrative "unorthodoxy."
parish into its medium?

Can the hierarchy re-make the

Because the question concerns the

Church as an organization, the answer lies as much in the
sociology of voluntary organizations as in secularization
and culture theory.
A classic work in that field which may shed light on
the question is Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956).

Their

subject was the International Typographical Union (ITU), a
labor union whose locals at the bottom were relatively
autonomous from the central administration at top.

Most

labor unions, generally, manifest Robert Michels' "Iron Law
of Oligarchy," formally espousing democratic processes but
actually experiencing almost total rule by a few long-term
leaders.

The ITU, however, institutionalized a two-party,

democratic system of rule.

No party or group of leaders
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held power for a substantial period of time, often because
of opposition from the locals.
My characterization of the Church resembles the ITU.
In both, the local organizations stand relatively autonomous
from the central administration.

Now, there are

considerable differences between the Catholic Church and the
ITU.

Most obviously, the Church never was democratic and

its structure of sacramental ministry may not permit
democracy in the future.

Furthermore, ITU members associate

with each other more frequently both formally and informally
than American Catholics, thus having a greater interest in
the union's administration than Catholics have in the
Church's.

But a comparative analysis of the two

organizations is possible in asmuchas Lipset, Trow, and
Coleman studied reasons for the lack of oligarchy as well as
the presence of democracy in the ITU.

The common reference

points are the characteristics shared by each which resist
oligarchy.

Only after determining by this comparison which

factors led to the decline of the Church's oligarchical
influence, can we turn to the question of the Church's
organizational future.
Absence of Oligarchy in the ITU
Most labor unions, according to Lipset, Trow and
Coleman, were organized by a few leaders who were able to
maintain oligarchy after the unions' founding.

The entities

further down the organization are kept subordinate to the
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central administration.
the bottom up."

The ITU was literally built "from

Its origin as a federation of smaller

printers' groups prevented the development of oligarchy at
the outset.

Throughout its history, the local organizations

have not subordinated their power to the central
administration.
Much of the reason for oligarchy's continued absence
in the ITU is the status of the printing occupation, both in
terms of socioeconomic position and occupational authority.
From its inception in the late Middle Ages, the printing
occupation identified itself as a skilled craft, and in
modern society as a profession.

Those who do perceive

themselves as working-class consider printing as the "most
intellectual of the manual trades" (Lipset, Trow and
Coleman, 1956: 26).

Printers also enjoy a great deal of

freedom from the authority of both shop and union managers.
They are free to conduct themselves in the shop as they see
fit.

The status of the printing trade overall creates a

narrow status gap between union leaders and the rank and
file.

As a result, rank and file members do not perceive

much of a difference between themselves and the leadership,
and the leaders lack a status motivation to retain their
positions.

For Lipset, Trow and Coleman, equality of

members and leaders discourages oligarchy.
ITU members engage in a number of activities with
other printers, mostly leisure in nature, which are not
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directly related to union activities.

The significance of

these "secondary organizations" is their autonomy from the
union adminstration, their ability to arouse members'
interest in the union's political arena independently of the
union leadership, and their ability to training rank and
file members in the art of leadership.

The high degree of

member interest which results prevents the union from being
able to establish oligarchy.

A highly involved ITU rank and

file stands as an obstacle to the leaders' effectively
establishing an oligarchy.

Thus, For Lipset, Trow and

Coleman, the members' involvement in secondary activities
prevents oligarchy.
The Laity's Similarities with the ITU Printers
Three of the characteristics of the printer's
community which Lipset, Trow and Coleman attribute to
discouraging oligarchy in the ITU exist among the Catholic
laity.
Like the ITU, the parishes literally have been built,
or more properly rebuilt, "from the ground up."

The laity

have voluntarily established many of the programs in the
parish.

And their newfound participation in worship and

parish governance has significantly shaped those areas.
Thus the autonomy of the parish was very much the laity's
doing.

Because of the parish's autonomy the hierarchy has

little power over the laity.

The question to address is

whether this diminished power of the hierarchy can be
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sustained as the absence of oligarchy has been sustained in
the ITU.

The answer, based on Lipset, Trow and Coleman's

analysis, is yes.
Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) asserted that equality
between members and leaders of a voluntary organization
discourages oligarchy.

The status gap between the laity and

the hierarchy has narrowed in a number of ways.

American

Catholics' socioeconomic status has increased during the
twentieth century.

A significant aspect of their upward

mobility has been their attainments of higher levels of
education.

The educated laity now perceive themselves as

competent to rely on their own religious judgments.

Another

aspect of that mobility has been an increase in managerial
and professional, or "self-directed" occupations.

Vatican

II also played a role in narrowing the status gap, by
declaring in many instances that the laity, the clergy, and
the hierarchy were equal.

In brief, the hierarchy cannot

effectively regain its position of influence over American
Catholics' beliefs and behaviors because they cannot prove
their superiority over lay individuals' own judgments.
Furthermore, American Catholics' participation in
parish activities is similar to ITU members' participation
in "secondary organizations" independent of the union.

Most

parish organizations exist with no reference to the
institutional Church in Rome.

Some, such as organizations

for homosexual Catholics, even exist against the Vatican's
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wishes.

By participating in these activities, Lipset, Trow

and Coleman would argue, the laity's interest in the Church
rises.

Although that interest cannot manifest itself in

voting, as in the ITU, this heightened interest might
pressure the hierarchy to back down and accept the laity's
definition of how the Church is to exist.

For instance,

Gallup and Castelli (1987: 177-178) assert that the American
bishops have "tolerated widespread internal dissent as a
means of keeping the Church intact" and that "by the sheer
numbers in which they have adopted this style of loyal
opposition, [the laity] have forced the American bishops to
accept their new definitions of Catholicism."

The hierarchy

in the Vatican can try to reaffirm its definitions and
methods of operating the Church.

But the laity, according

to this analysis, are unlikely to yield.

Thus, the Roman

hierarchy may be faced with having to permanently accept the
laity's ways of doing things, or losing considerable numbers
of lay Catholics for whom choosing a new church will not be
a practical or personal dilemma.

CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The purpose of this paper has been to examine a new
way of conceptualizing the catholic Church in the United
States.

The selective Catholicism concept suggests that, as

a result of many different changes in the twentieth century,
American Catholics ignore the Church's teaching authority
despite participating in its local "branches,'' namely the
parishes.

I emphasized in the introduction that it was a

concept which had received only cursory attention, being
mentioned almost as an aside in many discussions of American
Catholics.

I examined the definitions of selective

Catholicism, as gleaned from the literature, and spent the
bulk of my discussion analyzing its causes and its effects
on the Catholic organization.
Recent surveys of American Catholics empirically
indicate the existence of selective Catholicism.

Both

active and inactive Catholics often differ with the
teachings of the hierarchy.

When individual beliefs do

conform with hierarchical prescriptions, it is because
individual judgments allow them to, not because of any sense
of obedience.

These surveys also demonstrate that Mass

attendance rates are recovering from the declines of the
1960s and 1970s, which suggests that differences of opinion
with the hierarchy no longer cause Catholics to leave the
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Church.

Both social and ecclesiastical changes have caused

catholics to ignore the hierarchy while still participating
actively in the Church at the local level.
The literature dealing with American Catholics
suggests that a primary cause of selective Catholicism has
been the assimilation of American lay people into the
dominant culture.

One specific effect of that assimilation

has been the laity's exposure to the cultural forces of
privatized religion and radical individualism.

This was a

dominant factor in distancing American catholics from the
Church.

Empirical research, especially the Notre Dame

study, has demonstrated that contemporary American Catholics
indeed practice private religion.
At the same time, voluntarizing changes within the
Church not only encouraged Catholics to choose Catholicism
as their religion, but allowed them to practice selective
catholicism.

Vatican II facilitated a new understanding of

the Church as internally legitimizing selective Catholicism,
and it also allowed for more participatory and democratic
lay involvement in the local parishes.

As a result, the

Church now consists of two distinct levels: the hierarchical
institution and the local parishes.
Finally, I have predicted that selective Catholicism
will continue into the future, even if the hierarchy insists
on reasserting the teaching authority it enjoyed in the
immigrant Church.

In the event the hierarchy succeeds in
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doing this, selective Catholicism will cease only because
selective catholics will join some other religion.
In light of my assertion that this concept has
received inadequate attention, the task is now to propose
future study of the concept as well as my arguments
surrounding it.

The next step is empirical investigation of

selective catholicism and the hypotheses implied in this
paper.

Regarding the former, I suggest the task for

sociologists of religion is to survey lay Catholics to
determine the patterns of selective Catholicism.

Regarding

the latter, I suggest the task is to observe the causal line
of events which I've hypothesized lead to selective
Catholicism.
Types of Selective catholicism
A dominant theme in the literature about American
Catholics is that they are a heterogeneous population about
whom universal generalizations are difficult to establish.
This paper has attempted to do precisely that.

In such an

introduction to a concept, a detailed analysis of variations
of selective Catholicism has not been possible.
questions of detail remain, however.

The

For example, is there

a "scale" of selective Catholicism, a continuum from low to
high, on which to place Catholics?

The Notre Dame study

found that Catholics felt there were some topics which the
hierarchy could legitimately address, such as international
poverty.

They did not grant the hierarchy such legitimacy
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to speak on other areas closer to individual behavior, such
as sexuality issues.

I have suggested that this makes

little difference, since in the context of privatized
religion ultimate authority lies with the individual.
this remains to be proven.

But

Are there some areas of moral

discourse in which the laity are more likely to accept the
hierarchy's teachings on the basis of their authority.

More

to the point, which Catholics are more likely to accept
which teachings of the hierarchy, if any, on the basis of
its authority?
An

interesting element of that investigation will be

the variance according to parish.

The Notre Dame studies

revealed that "there is more consensus within parish than
within demographic groupings" (Leege, 1987a: 3).

Since

selective catholics participate heavily in the parishes, it
would be revealing to see what kinds of parish might contain
different degrees of selective Catholicism.

From there,

more complex theorizing as to the relationship between lay
Catholics and their parishes would be possible.
The goal of this investigation would be a model of the
Church's lower component, the collection of parishes,
according to the style of selective Catholicism.

Dann

(1976; 1978) proposed a model of "belonging" which placed
Catholics within a matrix according to their mode of
relating to and interacting with the Church.

A model based

on selective Catholicism could be constructed if certain
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patterns of selective behavior were discovered.

Dann's

model allowed for infinite variations in belonging,
according to an individual's ranking on the various
criteria.

A selective catholicism model of the Church would

have to allow the same thing, since the concept in question
is a form of individualism.
Testing the Causal Line: Hispanics
This paper has proposed a causal explanation for the
development of selective Catholicism.

Many changes among

American Catholics directly and indirectly, through
institutional detachment, led to its development.

As

American Catholics experienced socioeconomic and demographic
changes, their need for the Church as a protector
diminished.

Their attachments to the Church therefore

diminished, making them less likely to feel obligated to
obey the Church's teaching authority.

These changes also

thrust them into the mainstream American culture, in which
religion was privatized.

As Catholics "became American,"

they too privatized their religion, limiting its influence
to a private sphere of their social circles.

From that

sphere, the hierarchy could not influence the rest of their
lives.

And as a further consequence, American catholics

became "religious consumers."

The radical individualism

which started in the late 1960s, reinforced their
consumerist behavior, further distancing their decisionmaking from the influence of the hierarchy.

What has kept
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them involved in the Church has been the parishes;
adaptation to certain reforms of Vatican II, as well as
parish priests' tolerance for selective catholicism.
In order to test this hypothesis, the social scientist
would have to devise a way to test the effects of these
social changes on a group of Catholics.

The problem is that

for most Catholics, these changes have already occurred.
One could compare empirical analyses from earlier in the
century with those of today.

But a more beneficial

alternative would be to observe a group of immigrant
Catholics over time as they "become American," and
experience the same social forces as previous immigrant
groups.

Fortunately such a group may exist in the Hispanic

population.
Unfortunately, this suggestion may not be as simple as
it appears on the surface.

For one thing, Gallup and

Castelli (1987: 142) found that in many ways Hispanic
Catholics have "curiously loose institutional attachments."
The researcher needs to determine why that is so.

Is it a

result of a poor response by the American Church to their
needs?

If so, it may be only a matter of time before the

Church responds adequately to increase their attachments.
Time is one luxury the researcher may have, as the influx of
Hispanic immigrants does not appear to end any time soon.
Furthermore, the process of assimilation among
Hispanics may not occur as rapidly or in the same manner as
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it did for European immigrants.

The American economy of

today is vastly different than that of the first half of the
century.

European immigrant generations had the benefit of

industrial jobs to propel their socioeconomic mobility.

The

dual-level economy of today offers unskilled immigrants lowpaying service employment, which may not facilitate such
mobility.

It may be that Hispanics could become a permanent

"underclass."
However, the potential of a "living laboratory" to
study the hypotheses which the Hispanic population offers
makes such a time series study worth pursuing.
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